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AbstrAct: this paper explores the consequences of  acknowledging that we are the dead walking 
with the dead. i argue that if  we take the view that life frames death, rather than the view that 
death frames life, then we must refigure our living as ethical creatures. Using aristotle’s notion 
that we become virtuous by practising virtue, i argue that happiness, thought of  in terms of  
ethical living, should temper our attitude to death as the inevitable end we must all encounter. 
acknowledgement of  our dying and our death enhances the ethical imperative to live virtuously 
and to promote human flourishing. i adopt a Buddhist reading of  death and dying to interpret 
the aristotelian perspective. 
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i sit, writing, in a stolen land. history has caught up with the thieves who offi-
cially refuse to acknowledge their theft. So i begin by acknowledging the theft; and 
by acknowledging the traditional owners of  this land people, this country, where i sit, 
writing.
My acknowledgement should be seen in the context of  what i argue in this paper, 
since aristotle’s philosophy has been articulated from within a political system which 
failed to recognise what we today might call the full humanity of  some of  those who 
fall under its jurisdiction. in The Politics, aristotle argued that the state is a creation of  
nature, emerging as it did, from other naturally occurring groups (man and woman 
united conjugally, and slave and master, thence families and villages). he held that the 
end, the telos of  the family and the village is the state ‘and the nature of  a thing is its 
end’ (aristotle, Politics 1252b30). consequently, aristotle claimed the state is prior to the 
family and to the individual for an individual cannot survive in isolation. But it is the 
state that cultivates and perfects the social instinct ‘implanted in all men by nature’. 
Since the nature of  a thing is its end, and the end of  human nature is happiness, it 
is incumbent upon the state to produce the conditions under which human nature 
might achieve that end. We are presented with a picture of  a coalescing of  ends that 
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are viewed as congruous with each other. happiness ends up being tied to the well 
functioning state. 
however, aristotle also held that slavery and the subjection of  women are creations 
of  nature. he articulates the ‘natural’ dichotomies:
soul ruler master man
body ruled slave woman
in which the first occurring term of  each pair is superior to the second occurring term. 
he argues that slaves are living possessions, that slaves are by nature not in possession of  
themselves but are the possession of  another, the master (1253b25-37, 1254a10-14). in 
the case of  women, men are the rulers, women the ruled, and ‘this principle, of  neces-
sity, extends to all of  mankind’ (1254b14&15). the well-functioning state depends upon 
the functioning of  these dichotomies, in the value laden dualism they express. 
Aristotle’s interpretation of  ‘creation of  nature’, the naturally occurring order of  
things in which there are ruled and ruler, and the teleology which emerges from his view 
has been, arguably, immanent in the founding of  settler Australia and as it continues 
today. How Indigenous Australians were viewed and have continued to be viewed by 
the invading settlers and our descendants is embodied in Aboriginal Australians’ second 
rate status as Australian citizens highlighted by the theft of  their land, their people, their 
culture. In my view, many of  us have yet to come to terms with this. The use of  philosophies 
which advocate views like Aristotle’s, without a simultaneous acknowledgement of  their 
ontological elitism entailing problematic ethical assumption, white-washes and makes 
acceptable, their philosophies as a whole. In some sense, I sit here today on Aboriginal 
land because of  those philosophies as practised, and this recognition, I hope, is reflected 
in my acknowledging the traditional peoples of  Australia. It is not just that an individual 
cannot survive in isolation: it is that an individual cannot survive, cannot thrive, without 
her people: and the manipulation of  this intuition has been used politically to determine 
the fate of  millions, including Aboriginal Australians.
But I also write in the knowledge that we are all concerned with human happiness, 
our own and the happiness of  others, each of  which, like it or not, is inextricably linked 
with the other. Many of  us seem to think that happiness revolves around acquiring 
goods, where ‘goods’ is taken to be material possessions: cars, washing machines, houses 
and mobile telephones, all of  which have emerged as consumer items because of  the 
incredibly sophisticated scientific discoveries of  the past one hundred and fifty years. 
While it might be the case that goods in this sense do bring happiness, for they bring 
pleasure and satisfaction as well as responsibility, they can also stand in the way of  
happiness and of  human flourishing. It is lack of  these goods—basic necessities like food 
and water—just as much as their excess that brings misery suffering and prevail against 
human flourishing. It is also how we have used science to create misery that might lead 
us to think that science itself  is a two edged sword, bringing both succour and scourge. 
As the Dhammapada says, ‘Let us be free from pleasure and let us be free from pain; for 
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not to have pleasure is sorrow and to have pain is sorrow’ (Dhammapada 210). 
Noting the ambiguity of  the term ‘goods’, I remind you that there are also less 
tangible but highly contested goods, a fact noted by Iris Marion Young, that tempt and 
disrupt and over which we quarrel. One of  these goods, so often in dispute, is power. 
We see and understand power as something to be ‘got’, to be used for our benefit and 
the benefit of  others. We see power almost as a commodity, something to be bought and 
sold and bartered for, hardly even noticing that we exercise what we want in attempting 
to get what we want. Power as a good exhibited and performed in our relations with one 
another is highly desirable, highly desired. However, as Plato so astutely hypothesised 
in The Republic, both the just and the unjust person (he actually said ‘man’ but we will 
forgive him for that) would ultimately act in precisely the same way, unjustly, if  they were 
in possession of  Gyges’ ring. The good that power is reckoned to be, overwhelms its 
wielder, leading unfailingly to selfish preoccupation and self-interest. Power seems always 
corruptible. At length, the corruptibility of  power is transmuted by the corruptibility of  
the body. It is death that proves to be the greatest power, death that without fail we all 
come to, hopefully with a calm heart. In that sense, the sense that sees death as always 
present and always the victor, power is incorruptible. ‘Neither in the sky, nor deep in the 
ocean, nor in a mountain cave, nor anywhere, can we be free from the power of  death,’ 
declares the Dhammapada (Dhammapada 128).1 
I am mostly concerned here, though, not with material goods or even goods of  a 
less palpable nature although I am of  course, tangentially so. One cannot really talk 
about one without talking about, or assuming, all. I wonder in this paper, about how 
we might live a good life and what that notion, a ‘good life’, might mean. I make the 
assumption that I am privileged, as are many others, to be able to actually ponder this 
question.
That all said, I have a flashing image of  voracious and insistent words, gabbling at 
me, at you, jostling for the front row, leaping up and shouting, ‘Me! Me!’, that keeps 
infiltrating my consciousness. Those words have lives of  their own. They have a palpable, 
material presence, a thickness and substantiality which makes them difficult to ignore. 
And they are ubiquitous. One can go hardly anywhere and not encounter them. Not 
only are they ubiquitous, the words are chameleon like, taking on the shapes, sizes and 
colours of  their environments. And the words appropriate those environments, making 
them their own. Like squabbling, naughty children, the words disruptively compete for 
supremacy, aggressively struggling for victory. And what is the victory for which those 
words strive? It is the winning of  truth and the winning over truth, both, sometimes 
simultaneously. 
My paper is written then in the awareness that there may already be too many 
words. and also that words are, in part, responsible for constructing a world, or perhaps 
1. the translation of  the Dhammapada i have uses the term ‘man’ and ‘he’ throughout. i have substituted 
‘we’, ‘us’, ‘they’ for that term. i take it that the way of  the Buddha is open to all, women and men and that 
the Dhammapada, like all texts, is constrained by ontological assumptions, historical circumstance and social 
relations.
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i should say, worlds, which pre-dispose against the living of  a good, indeed a beautiful life, 
and maybe even conceiving of  such a possibility. But words also propitiously construct 
worlds. the contrariness of  words, their possibilities for negativity and affirmation, 
contemporaneously subtends and permeates our being in the world. 
hélène cixous suggests that there are words that are magical. She cites the twentieth 
century russian writer, tsvetaeva, who wrote that ‘(t)here are magical words, magical 
apart from their meanings … physically magical, with a magic inherent in the sound 
itself, words that before they deliver a message already have meaning … it is possible that 
each person has in his own life his own magic words ….’ cixous goes on to comment, 
‘this is good news, because if  you haven’t yet found your own personal magic words, 
you still have time to find them. everyone has their own magic words. the moment you 
find your magic word—it may be one word or several—then you have the key, you can 
start writing’ (cixous 1993:90).
Magical words are transformative, and transform in different ways. the young boy’s 
declaration that the emperor was not actually wearing clothes, his audacity in uttering 
those words, was transforming: a jolting of  consciousness which salvaged truth. the 
words of  the boy constituted a transformative moment for the whole of  the kingdom: 
i hope that in reading this you might find some magical words for you, some word or 
words to transform and maybe to enhance your life. a huge ask, i know, perhaps even 
above all, from an academic philosopher. But …
Walking With Death
‘never walk with a dead man’. that is the epigram that begins the film, Dead Man. 
let us say also, ‘never walk with a dead woman, either’. ‘never walk with a dead person’ 
is even better. think about these words: never walk with a dead person. Were we never 
to walk with a dead person, we should never walk with anyone. We should always walk 
alone. More dramatically, we should never walk at all, not even with ourselves. For you 
see we are all dead persons. this is the most sobering, confronting fact of  our human 
lives, that we are all dead in the future, that the future is now and that now no longer is 
here. our consciousness of  our mortality, our consciousness that we are mundane—of  
the earth—and that it is to the earth that we shall return, weaves itself  into our lives: we 
are the dead walking with the dead. like the fine threads of  a magnificent tapestry, that 
consciousness is not always clear to us. We are the dead walking with the dead because 
we are walking with our pasts, but also with our futures. But we are walking now and 
this is our present. all our moments are moments of  death, ineluctably, be they past, 
future or present.
however—and this is a most important ‘however’—we are not quite dead, not yet. 
there is a not-yetness to death which accompanies our being the dead walking with the 
dead. our deaths are framed by our lives, our being. and our lives, our being, bring to 
our deaths their not-yetness: we are, we are alive. For us, this fact, the fact that opposes 
the galling fact of  our mortality, is sublime: we live, we are in not-yetness, just as we die 
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in not-yetness. and it is how we live that not-yetness that counts. our being is a being 
of  possibilities, a living interrogation of  actuality, the fact that we are, in the face of  
potential life which is finalised in death. 
What does it mean to be human, to live in not-yetness and to be alive? how are we 
to think of  this life which frames our deaths? to be human can be articulated in terms 
of  deliberately living that not-yetness as best as we can, knowing that the end of  life is 
death. the Dhammapada tells us that ‘(j)ust as a keeper of  cows drives their cows into the 
fields, old age and death drive living beings far into the fields of  death’ (Dhammapada 
135). a short time later it declares that we should ‘(h)ave faith like a noble horse touched 
by the whip. By faith, by virtue and energy, by deep contemplation and vision by wisdom 
and by right action, you shall overcome the sorrows of  life’ (Dhammapada 144). For 
Buddhists, overcoming the sorrows of  life entails overcoming the sorrow of  death and 
its inevitability. 
the key way to doing this is to live without harming oneself  or others. an important 
aspect of  the Dhamma is that harming others entails that one harms oneself  and that 
harming oneself  inevitably entails harming others; doing good for others bring good 
to oneself, just as doing good for oneself, brings good to others. ‘the wrong action 
seems sweet to the fool until the reaction comes and brings pain, and the bitter fruits 
of  wrong deeds have then to be eaten by the fool … We may find pain in doing good 
as long as our good has not given fruit; but when the fruit of  good comes, then we find 
good indeed … if  we seek happiness for ourselves by making others unhappy, we are 
bound in the chains of  hate and from those we cannot be free’ (Dhammapada 69, 120, 
291). this knowledge is wrought in suffering but also in happiness, good heartedness 
and generosity. Suffering and happiness, are the effects of  our actions, our being, and 
carry us to the moment when not-yetness ceases to be mere potential, when not-yetness 
is actualised in and as death. they are also the causal factors which predispose us to 
further acts of  happiness and suffering.
We have, then, a vested interest in practising virtue, in practising right action. We can 
be happy only if  we live a life of  goodness. Disposition, too, plays a role in the making 
of  happiness through right action. the eightfold Path focuses on how we are disposed 
to the world, the kinds of  attitudes we should embody. By gradually disentangling 
ourselves from those attitudes and actions that bring us misery, including clinging in 
vain to our mortality, we will know a deep happiness resonant with the openness of  
being, resonant that is with knowledge of  our finitude. We know we are living rightly if  
we and those around us are happy in this sense.
Discussing virtue and, in particular, the virtue of  courage, aristotle remarked that 
the more one ‘is possessed of  virtue in its entirety and the happier (one) is, the more (one) 
will be pained at the thought of  death; for life is best worth living for such a man, and 
he knowingly loses the greatest goods and this is painful’ (aristotle, 1972: 1117b13). For 
aristotle, the happier one is, the more repulsive will the gaze of  death appear to be. and 
aristotle, it could be argued, is the voice of  natural attitude: death is an inevitable but 
miserable end for us all: death is something unspeakable, truly too awful to contemplate. 
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and we don’t think about it because well, frankly, it is too horrible. But suppose we were 
to re-figure this attitude, suppose we were to think, of  life as that which frames death 
rather than of  death as the spectre that lingers menacingly always in the background, 
framing everything that we do and see and feel and believe and love, framing our lives, 
our aliveness. What effect would that have? 
Buddhists are very honest about mortality: death will come but the gift of  this 
conscious, human life is immeasurably great and a means of  transforming the inevitability 
of  death. they have some wonderful stories that are salient to the thesis of  this paper. i 
take these stories from The Tibetan Book of  Living and Dying. You may be familiar with an 
anecdote, either from that book or another text, about krisha gotami, a contemporary 
of  gotama, the Buddha. krisha gotami’s child died and she was overcome with grief; 
she wanted her child’s life restored. She eventually found the Buddha who told her that 
her affliction would be healed if  she could bring to him a mustard seed from a house 
that had never experienced death. So off  she set, but at every house she came to, death 
had been a visitor. of  course krisha gotami could not find a deathless house: there was 
no mustard seed to be had. So she took her child to the charnel ground, said farewell, 
and found the Buddha again to tell him of  the insight she had achieved. note that the 
Buddha did not promise to restore the life of  krisha gotami’s child: he said that her 
affliction would be healed. tuck that in the cupboards of  your minds for the moment.
the second story concerns a woman who was dying, and who was despairing at 
the thought, as she had only a few months to live. She sought out a tibetan master, 
Dudjom rinpoche, and entreated him to help her. She was met by chuckling and the 
words, ‘You see we are all dying. it’s only a matter of  time. Some of  us just die sooner 
than others’ (Sogyal rinpoche 30). one reading of  this is that the response was grossly 
insensitive and that Dudjom rinpoche showed little compassion towards the dying 
woman. another, however, is that he showed consummate compassion, that this was 
really one of  the few appropriate things he could say.
the contrast between the grief  of  aristotle’s virtuous happy person, his person who 
has achieved happiness, and the responses of  Buddhists is not unremarkable. on the 
one hand, aristotle’s person is pained at the thought of  death because s/he is happy 
and death is contrary to happiness; on the other, the Buddhist orientation is almost 
cavalier. But if  we think the Buddhist recognition that radical impermanence—death—
disrupts, and indeed is the condition of  all being, is cavalier, then we might profit from 
reflecting on our own metaphysical assumptions. the Buddhist attitude is reminiscent 
of  Socrates’ attitude to death in the Phaedo (Plato, 2003:117) where death is not to 
be feared but welcomed, a position markedly different from aristotle whose attitude 
reflects the Parmenidean commitment to permanence. aristotle’s unmoved mover, a 
changeless ontological origin of  all being is more closely aligned with Parmenides than 
it is with inherent changeableness (if  for example he were heracleitian) which i think is 
implicit in Socrates’ attitude.2 the philosophies of  inherent change and of  permanence 
2. this point requires deeper philosophical analysis not appropriate to this paper.
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reflect very different metaphysical and phenomenological commitments found in their 
respective attitudes to death.
But what interests me most about these philosophies, is that they each attach 
enormous importance to a happiness that is not tied to the possession of  material objects. 
the practice of  psychological balance as a living philosophy is enacted in conceiving of  
the purpose of  life as virtuous commitment. in order to be happy, in order to promote 
the flourishing of  the polis, or of  all sentient creatures, one lives rightly. For Buddhists, 
the purpose of  life is to see things as they are, to practise compassion, detachment 
and realise nirvana. For both aristotle and Buddhists generally, happiness is an effect 
of  living rightly, notwithstanding the historico-cultural differences that fill out what it 
means to live rightly. 
Some of  the happiest people i have ever met are tibetan Buddhists. these are 
dispossessed people, people who have and still suffer, people who have few material 
possessions but who have hearts as full and as deep as the cosmos. For them, happiness 
is a practice of  the heart, a disposition towards the world, a deeply compassionate way 
of  being. like aristotle’s philosophy of  happiness the relation between living ethically 
and happiness is expressed in the philosophical praxis of  the lives of  these people.
For aristotle, one becomes happy by being virtuous. how does one become virtuous? 
By practising not rehearsing virtue. Moral virtue. Moral virtue like courage, like 
temperance. Moral virtue which becomes a habit, a habit of  the mind. a conscientious, 
deliberate, habit, a habit that embodies a state of  character. that state of  character 
exhibits harmony, balance, moderation, the golden mean as it has been called. For 
Buddhists, one becomes enlightened by practising compassion, by practising, and here, 
again, i do not mean ‘rehearsing’ but performing, enacting, living, the eightfold noble 
path. Doing, becoming and being are entwined: one does, one becomes, one is. how 
one acts in the world, on the world is paramount and it is here that the ethical life 
unfolds. and that is where happiness lies.
Both positions will entail carrying oneself  lightly through life, lightly with a lightness 
that is grounded in the world. and here we encounter a difficulty: how does one do 
that? how does one do that in a world bombarded with words and aggression and 
seduction and pushes and pulls and tugs and demands? how does one do that? add 
that question to the cupboards of  your minds.
Walking With Science
one way of  reading the various projects of  science, is that those projects promote 
happiness, happiness not only for humans but for all sentient creatures. read in this 
way, science becomes a set of  social practices, derived from particular understandings 
of  the nature of  the cosmos and of  social groupings. that is one way. another way 
is to take up the opposing view: that science, even as a set of  social practices destroys 
happiness. if, as seems to be the case at the moment, our world leaders are married to, 
and have consummated their nuptials with thanatos, then we need to observe that the 
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political practice of  science is deeply antagonistic to life. one could conceive of  those 
leaders as the instruments of  science thought of, firstly, in the latter mode. their words 
legitimate the ritualisation of  destruction, the exercise of  science in its magnificent 
awfulness, its cataclysmic dreadfulness. But perhaps this is too grim a view. after all, 
are there not multitudes of  ways in which science does promote or has promoted 
happiness? are not world leaders instruments of  science in this mode, too? have not 
world leaders encouraged the use and development of  science for the advancement of  
human happiness? 
the list of  scientific advances which promote human flourishing in a world framed 
by compassion, the awareness that practical knowledge and discovery can alleviate 
suffering is salutary: the Salk vaccine (Salk), the x-ray (the curies), penicillin (Florey), 
peri-natal care, electricity, … But then we move to anti-depressants, nuclear reactors, 
space ships to the moon (perhaps), television, the internet, cars, aeroplanes. and from 
there to nylon undies, microwave ovens, central heating, hollywood, champagne, 
national Parks, plastic surgery, reproductive technologies: the list goes on and on but 
seems to become enmired by the constraints of  desire and pleasure rather than necessity 
and flourishing … this is desire and pleasure for the few at the expense of  the many 
still suffering, still with no water, still plagued by malnutrition. Desire seems to conspire 
with and become complicit with the social practice of  science for the gratification of  
the relatively few. 
the domain of  euphoric science where science is conceived of  as the champion of  
human flourishing seems so vulnerable. For it is a domain amongst many, a domain of  
the real world as it is in us: euphoric and/or desolate. it is the world in which we act and 
which acts upon us: it is the domain of  the lightness of  living, as well as despair. Such 
a fragile world! For overall, it might be claimed, our world as a totality is constituted 
and maintained by science, a world where happiness is derivative less of  the practice 
of  virtue, more of  the pursuit of  pleasure, ease, comfort. a world, then constituted and 
maintained by those who use science: you and i, as well as world leaders. 
to speak of  lightness of  living in a world where happiness is the telos, seems 
anathema to current human pursuits. currently, it might be claimed, science has more 
power than anything else. an awesome thought, that: science has more power than 
anything else. another item for the cupboard.
But turn around and look back, just momentarily. not just the world of  ‘euphoric 
science’. Yet also the world of  destructive science. We are in the world that is in us, the 
world in which we act and which acts upon us, yes truly. it is a Janus-faced world. Both 
faces, one world, and walking with science, which, dear me, is walking with death. and 
an irony, a paradox, perhaps both, perhaps neither: that we shun death, and that our 
world leaders have married not only themselves to death, but us, also. the words again, 
those words, words which give us world leaders through the ballot box. Words which 
announce, ultimately, not only the infidelity of  world leaders, but the infidelity of  those 
who facilitate their world leadership. that is me; and that is you.
there is an advertisement for the australian Quarantine Service which has been 
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showing recently on television. in that advertisement, a youngish man, Steve irwin, in 
shorts, socks and boots dangles a piece of  meat in front of  a crocodile. he teases the 
crocodile, not quite giving it the meat. the crocodile eyes the youngish man, clearly 
anticipating having a meal (and maybe the youngish man will be the meal: is that what 
we might think?). the youngish man eyes the crocodile, and as he does that, he chats to 
us, the viewers, about letting dangerous flora and fauna into the country. and then he 
gives the crocodile the meat (not a gift of  himself, mind you). the youngish man is flirting 
with death. in a non-advertising capacity, he flirts with death even more outrageously 
when, while holding his young child in his arms he feeds, apparently as a publicity 
stunt, another crocodile. the youngish man is making a point, facing death. Worse still 
his ego over-rides the interests of  his very own child: such foolish, immoral behaviour 
to consciously risk the life of  another as entertainment. things could go wrong: the 
crocodile might lunge at him and have him or his child for a feed instead of  the meat 
in the young man’s hand. Undoubtedly, there would be safeguards in the making of  the 
advertisement, perhaps someone nearby with a stun gun, or worse. Maybe we would 
have loved it more if  things had gone wrong. or maybe it’s all not real anyway, a 
technological fraud, a product of  digital mastery. Maybe … 
the youngish man must know that he is taking an enormous risk. he must know 
that his control is illusory. he must know, yet he consciously chooses to play with death, to 
go on a honeymoon with thanatos, the honeymoon before the consummation. Married 
already to thanatos, we are not much different from this youngish man in our flirting 
with science as we do. the youngish man has an alternative. that involves leaving the 
crocodile to be a crocodile, respecting its crocodileness, walking at a respectful distance 
where he cannot be grabbed and consumed. But that would involve detachment, the 
relinquishing of  power; and we, as human beings find that a difficult undertaking. 
gillian rose captures the spirit of  what i am attempting to say here, when she 
quotes (from whom, i am not sure and it could even be her—she was such a good writer): 
‘Be—and at the same time know the terms of  the negation’ (rose 146). We are alive: 
we are, yet we refuse the terms of  the negation when we have a failure of  courage in 
the exercise of  our judgement. We know that we will die. and we deny that we will die, 
that we are walking with the dead, when we use science as we do, when we tempt its 
snapping jaws as if  there is someone standing by with a stun gun. Well, there isn’t, not 
even the United States of  america. For the US is a rogue crocodile tempter, in spite 
of  its rhetoric of  liberty, as is any nation that flaunts science through the development 
of  weapons of  death (euphemistically now, weapons of  mass destruction). Science is 
incapable of  redeeming itself  once those weapons have been used; and nature may 
triumph, but how is an unknown.
Walking With the living: a BeaUtiFUl liFe
Perhaps my writing difficulty is transparent to you now. not-yetness, it seems, is in 
danger of  itself  being reduced to a pile of  rubble, but i insist on returning to thoughts 
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of  a beautiful life, a life which is possible. that we are alive and capable of  living 
happiness might seem like a western liberal democratic ideal, applicable to an already 
privileged ‘we’ but inapplicable to millions of  inhabitants of  underdeveloped, poverty 
stricken, drought/flood, infectious disease affected countries—and some inhabitants 
of  western liberal democracies, for we should not forget the developed poor. i could 
be persuaded that western liberal democracy is the best model of  polity we have, as 
my friend Peter corrigan argues. But western liberal democracy has its foundations in 
colonial imperialism and the continuance of  that imperialism, albeit in slightly different 
form, is unavoidably worrying. the plight of  indigenous australians can be seen from 
this perspective: loss of  land and destruction of  culture without due acknowledgement 
that this is the case, affirms the dominance of  Western history and democracy.
this brings us back to the cupboard and what is tucked away there. three things, 
i am sure you recall: 
1. the healing of  krisha gotami’s affliction
2. how one carries oneself  lightly through life given the world i have been 
describing
3. that science has more power than anything else
a few weeks ago, i saw the moon rise over the ocean. it began as the tiniest slip of  
golden light before it emerged in its magnificent fullness. imagine the full moon’s rising 
out of  the edge of  the ocean and then over the ocean. imagine the texture of  the air, 
how the air smells, what the light is like, what the ocean sounds like. Science did not 
make the moon rise, nor did any human enterprise. it just rose: not for me, not for you, 
but because that is the way things are. and it was beautiful because that is the way some 
things are. recently, earthquakes have devastated South asian countries: thousands 
have died and some have even died on mercy missions to help survivors. Science did 
not make the earthquake, nor did any human enterprise. it was terrifyingly destructive 
because that is the way some things are. Daily, we cure our fellow humans, and ensure 
the supply of  fresh water, clean food, drugs and surgery. Science and love and virtue, 
all human enterprises make this happen. that is the way things are because we have 
made it so. Daily we kill and maim and torture our fellow humans. We do this with our 
ingenuity, and with science. that is the way things are because we have made it so. our 
actions corrupt our ingenuity, our noble reason, our very knowing.
the word ‘science’ comes from the latin, ‘scientia’, meaning to know. its modern 
connotations are heavily inscribed by notions of  observation, hypothesising, testing 
of  hypotheses, proof  and truth. implicit in modern conceptions of  science is another 
notion, that of  objectivity, which suggests that there is a world beyond, and independent 
of, the languages we use to capture that world in the scientific models we construct 
and which, we assert, accurately reflect what we believe to be reality. [of  course there 
is a philosophical debate here into which i am not going to enter. one can imagine 
this as an essay or exam question, with the word, ‘Discuss’ written after it.] the word 
‘philosophy’, greek in origin, conjoins love and wisdom, the love of  wisdom. ‘theology’ 
again greek in origin, has come to mean the study of  god, but may equally well be 
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rendered the word of  god, or the reason of  god, or the logic of  god, since ‘logos’ has 
multifarious meanings. Most of  us are undoubtedly familiar with all of  these origins. 
it is said that for the ancient greeks, philosophy began in wonder; for Descartes, 
philosophy began in doubt and the quest for certainty; the english philosopher Simon 
critchley thinks that philosophy begins in disappointment. My hunch is that science 
and theology begin where philosophy begins. My hunch is also that there is a kind 
of  synchronicity of  origins: that wonder, certainty, doubt and disappointment are, 
each of  them, originary sites for the three disciplines. So there is not one point of  
emergence at all, but simultaneously many. that object of  wonder, doubt, certainty and 
disappointment is there, primarily, in observation, in, if  you like, noticing the world. i 
can’t prove that, it’s just my hunch. 
all three are human enterprises and begin in the sensual body, in the eye that observes 
the rising moon, the ear that hears the rustling whisper of  leaves, the mouth that tastes 
the deliciousness of  ripe fruit. it is the body that observes and later, imagines, the full 
moon’s rising out of  the edge of  the ocean and then over the ocean; that observes and 
later, imagines, the texture of  the air, how the air smells, what the light is like, what the 
ocean sounds like. observation and what we do with our observation when constituted 
as our experience, is fundamental to philosophy, science and theology.
Something was revealed to krisha gotami when she went to look for the mustard 
seed. She discovered that death is omnipresent: she observed that death is omnipresent. 
that observation helped her to re-figure her grief. it was the re-figuring of  krisha 
gotami’s grief  that was the healing of  her affliction. the Buddha identified her 
affliction differently from the way in which she did. For her, it was grief  at the death 
of  her daughter. For him, her affliction was the inability to see things as they are: that 
death is inevitable and everywhere and that there is no escape. he knew that she had to 
re-orient her thinking in order to be released from her suffering and to find happiness. 
that demands courage, insight and responsibility, all of  which might be thought of  as 
moral virtues. 
it is in this way, in the developing of  what i am thinking of  as moral virtues that 
one can carry oneself  lightly through life. While it is the case that truly dreadful things 
happen both to ourselves and others, others who are friends and who are strangers, it 
is also truly the case that the moon rises over the ocean and that it can be observed, 
noticed. and it is also the case that if  we are to be morally virtuous then the happening 
of  dreadful things will, inevitably, cease. krisha gotama took responsibility for her 
grief. She took responsibility for her mind and its disorganised, rampaging emotional 
contents, its uproarious thoughts. Doing that put her on the path to carrying herself  
lightly through life.
how many people see the moon rise, full or otherwise, over the sea or anywhere 
else? how many people, given the impoverishing state of  the environment, can actually 
see the moon? let us try on this thought: it is the power of  science that prevents the 
seeing of  the moon; it is also the power of  science that permits the seeing of  the moon 
in ways never thought possible since before the time of  galileo. Some of  those ways, 
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paradoxically, the ways of  seeing the moon, now contribute to preventing our seeing the 
moon. We have to pollute planet earth in order to get to the moon. We have to dig up 
planet earth, re-fashion the contents of  planet earth, mine our source in order to explore 
the moon . . .
But of  course that is not truth simpliciter. explorations of  the moon are a small 
part of  our diminishing environment which is complemented by our still accelerating 
environmental imperialism: there is a multitude of  other factors which contribute to 
limiting what we can see in the sky, day or night. it is not only the moon, the seeing of  
which is limited, is it?
the power of  science, more powerful than anything else, more powerful than 
Superman, just as he is more powerful than a locomotive. But to argue that is to disavow 
the responsibility of  those who use science, however it is used, isn’t it? (and remember, 
it is us, all of  us.) isn’t that to dismiss the role that the body who thinks and builds, who 
plans and schemes, who invents and makes happy, who invents and destroys, plays in our 
deteriorating world? isn’t that to ascribe to science something which is unascribable? 
Yes, it is. the truth is that it is not science that is more powerful than anything else: 
it is the human mind. What we do with what we invent, what we discover, makes us 
powerful. and we have discovered more and more ingenious ways to kill, to maim, to 
destroy. and while we do not admit this, we are complicit in our own destruction, in our 
own wilful, premature, marriages with thanatos. 
hence we need, it seems to me, to re-figure ourselves as did krisha gotami: we 
need to see things as they are and we need to accept responsibility for our minds. We 
need to clean up the messed up house where the goblins rampantly run. We all share the 
same affliction, you see, as krisha gotami. i argued earlier that for both aristotle and 
Buddhists, one achieves one’s ends by embracing one’s mind and ordering its contents 
through action, through embodying virtue. that needs to be done with an intense 
sense of  responsibility to ourselves and to everyone else. and that all entails acting 
in ways conducive to flourishing, conducive to becoming more and more involved in 
the loveliness of  life. We live happiness and we live a beautiful life when we do this. 
happiness, thus, it seems to me, is a matter of  seeing things as they are, of  accepting 
what and how they are, and of  living consciously in that knowledge. Metaphorically, it 
is to see the full moon rising out of  the ocean, beginning as a slip of  gold.
there might well be an aporia here, the irresolvable dilemma of  knowing that we 
are mortal, accepting that, yet resisting the cultivation of  death through destructive 
science. after all, the thesis of  this paper is that we should see things as they are and 
accept them: that is how we are to be happy. But i am not proposing a philosophy of  
quietism at all: no, not at all. For that, it seems to me, would be to acquiesce to the idea 
that death frames life. recall that i wondered what the effect would be of  thinking of  
life as that which frames death rather than the contrary position (death frames life). the 
effect, i suggest, would be that death is re-figured as a natural end of  life. as an end to 
life, it is not distinct from life, but as that towards which life is directed. the not-yetness 
that is life demands conditions under which life can come into its fullness and then 
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wane, just as the moon waxes and wanes. knowledge of  death, acceptance of  death 
thus becomes an aspect of  the process of  life, of  not-yetness. 
listen to this: it is a short quote from Philippe ariès’ superb book, The Hour of  
Our Death. ariès is commenting on the death of  a peasant in a la Fontaine Fable. the 
peasant ‘dies like the knight in the Chanson (de Roland), or like those peasants in the heart 
of  russia whom Solzhenitsyn describes in Cancer Ward: ‘but now, pacing the ward, he 
recalled how those old people had died in their villages along the kama river—whether 
they were russians , tartars, or Udmurts. they did not bluster, fight back or boast they 
would never die. they took death calmly. Far from postponing the final reckoning , they 
got ready, little by little, and in good time decided who was to get the mare and who the 
foal, who the homespun coat and who the boots, then they passed on peacefully , as if  
simply moving to another cottage’ (ariès 1981: 16).
As if  simply moving to another cottage … evocation that is sublimely simple. there is 
much to be learned from history. on the other hand, perhaps it is nauseatingly romantic 
to think that we might all be as the peasant. after all we live in a post-industrial society 
where our concerns are very different from those of  a peasant. or are they? 
conclUSion
living an ethical life, living a beautiful life means living our not-yetness responsibly 
in happiness. i suspect that this is probably both an enormously simple, yet supremely 
complicated task. and i could be wrong: i could have missed something that is very 
important in this context. But these are some conclusions that i have slowly come to 
over the past few years, as perhaps, have many of  you already.
Well, there were many words clamouring to be spoken in the writing of  this paper. 
My hope is that i have practised discernment in choosing which ones to write, and then 
to utter. to follow in the footsteps of  Wittgenstein, who ended The Tractatus by saying 
what cannot be spoken must be passed over in silence (or words to that effect), i now 
hand you over to silence.
Dr. Frances gray 
Philosophy, School of  Social Science 
University of  new england
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